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NOTE
THE TENTH CIRCUIT REDISCOVERS NEPA's
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION POLICIES IN
SIERRA CLUB V HODEL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1987, Garfield County in southern Utah decided to upgrade a twenty-
eight-mile stretch of the Burr Trail from a one-lane dirt road into a two-
lane graveled road. The Burr Trail, which Garfield County has maintained
since the 1940s, runs across or adjacent to Capitol Reef National Park,
the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, and two wilderness study
areas2 (WSAs). The county sought to improve and widen the road to
facilitate travel between the town of Boulder and these federal lands.
Environmental groups3 ("Sierra Club") objected to the county's plan and
filed suit in the federal district court for the central district of Utah.4 Two
issues arose from this controversy.5 First, does the Bureau of Land Man-
agement's (BLM) involvement in this project 6 constitute "major federal
action" within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 ("NEPA"),7 thereby triggering the act's procedural requirements.
Second, if NEPA's threshold issue of major federal action is met, can
prior environmental studies supplemented by evidence presented at trial
substitute for an environmental assessment (EA) and finding of no sig-
nificant impact (FONSI).
In its pleadings, Sierra Club claimed that the county was required to
obtain BLM's determination of the scope of the right-of-way' and BLM's
authorization under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
I. 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
2. Steep Creek WSA and North Escalante WSA. Id. at 1073.
3. Sierra Club, National Parks and Conservation Association, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,
and the Wilderness Society.
4. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F Supp. 594 (C.D. Utah 1987), af d in part, rev'd in part, 848
F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
5. In a third issue not addressed in this note, Sierra Club also attacked Garfield County's plan
on the grounds that the county did not possess a valid right-of-way, or alternatively, that if the county
did have a right-of-way, its scope is limited to the historical uses of the trial. For a further discussion
of this issue, see Note, Not Just Another Pre-emption Case, 30 Nat. Res. J. 217 (1990).
6. The District Court described BLM participation in the road project as follows: "attendance at
Garfield County planning meetings, expressing its opinion that Garfield County has a valid right-
of-way, reviewing the stakes laid by engineers along the trail, determining that the project is entirely
within the county's right-of-way, concluding that FLPMA does not restrict the project, and promising
to monitor the construction as it progresses." 675 F. Supp. at 612.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
8. This determination is based on Utah state law. BLM applied the state standard of "reasonable
and necessary" to determine the scope of the right-of-way. 675 F. Supp. at 606.
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("FLPMA") 9 for road improvements affecting WSAs before beginning
the road project.'" Sierra Club further claimed these BLM activities cou-
pled with BLM's dedication of time and personnel constitute a "major
federal action" which "significantly affects the human environment" within
the meaning of NEPA," and therefore, BLM is required to prepare an
environmental assessment of the effects of the project. 2 Finally, Sierra
Club asked the district court to be the finder of all factual issues in the
case. 13
The county denied that it needed BLM approval for its action, claiming
it had a valid, existing right-of-way. Based on this right, the county
rejected Sierra Club's argument that the road expansion constituted a
major federal action.' 4
The BLM claimed its responsibilities were limited to reviewing the
road expansion's effects on federal interests. BLM also determined that
the county has a valid right-of-way, negating any need to obtain BLM
authorization of the road project. The agency claimed that it had no
authority over the roadwork, and consequently, the project did not con-
stitute major federal action. BLM futher maintained that even if major
federal action existed, substantial evidence contained in prior environ-
mental studies of the area showed that the action did not significantly
affect the human environment. Therefore, BLM argued it should not be
required to prepare a specific EA.
On November 30, 1987, the federal district court for the central district
of Utah held that BLM's participation" in the county's project constituted
major federal action, but that an environmental assessment was not re-
quired in this case.' 7 The court found that previous environmental studies
in addition to evidence presented at the twenty-five-day trial affirmed
BLM's position that the project had not significant impact on the envi-
ronment. 8 Thus, though BLM's role triggered NEPA, the act's procedural
requirements had already been satisfied. Sierra Club, Garfield County,
and BLM appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On June 6, 1988, the Tenth Circuit agreed that BLM's role in this
project constituted major federal action, thereby triggering NEPA. '" The
Tenth Circuit did not, however, agree with the district court that all aspects
of BLM's participation amounted to major federal action.20 The court of
9. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
10. 848 F2d at 1073.
I1. 42 U.S.C. §4332(C) (1982).
12. 848 F.2d at 1073-74.
13. See id. at 1092; 675 F. Supp. at 602.
14. 675 F. Supp. at 600.
15. Id.
16. See infra note 6.
17. 675 F. Supp. at 613.
18. Id. at 615. BLM never issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) in the case.
19. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1090 (10th Cir. 1988).
20. Id.
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appeals only found major federal action in BLM's duty to protect WSAs
from "unnecessary and undue degradation" under FLPMA.Y Further, the
Tenth Circuit held that once major federal action is found, a court's only
recourse is to remand the case to the appropriate federal agency to prepare
an EA. The presentation of environmental evidence at trial, and the
subsequent district court finding of no significant impact, "unlawfully
usurped the agency's dominion over that issue." 2 The appeals court
remanded the case with instructions to BLM to prepare an EA for those
portions of the project which impact on a WSA.23 This decision allowed
Garfield County to begin upgrading sections of the Burr Trail which do
not environmentally impact WSAs.' 4
BACKGROUND
National Environmental Policy Act
In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, and
on New Year's Day, 1970, President Nixon signed it into law. NEPA
requires all federal agencies which propose "major federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment" to include with
their proposal a detailed statement of its environmental impact.' In Bal-
timore Gas & Electric v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,26 the
Supreme Court described the "twin aims" of the act:
First, it [NEPAl places upon an agency the obligation to consider
every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed
action. Second, it ensures that the agency will inform the public that
it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmak-
ing process."'
Although NEPA's effectiveness in promoting alternative governmental
actions has been questioned, 8 it forces federal agencies to study and
consider the environmental consequences of these actions, and to make
this information available to the public. 9
21. 42 U.S.C. §4332(C) (1982).
22. 848 F2d at 1092-93.
23. Id. at 1096.
24. Approximately 30% of the road is bounded on each side by a WSA. 675 F. Supp. at 608.
25. 42 U.S.C. §4332(C) (1982).
26. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
27. Id. at 97-98 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978)).
28. See Hill & Ortolano, NEPA's Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives: A Crucial Test, 18
Nat. Res. J. 285 (1978).
29. The power of the statute may not be as great as environmentalists had originally hoped, but
NEPA's effect on agency decisionmaking, though limited, has probably been beneficial. D.R. Man-
delker, NEPA Law and Litigation Ch. 11 (1984); see also W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 697-
701 (1977); J. Battle, Environmental Decisionmaking and NEPA I I 1-13 (1986).
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NEPA's Trigger-Major Federal Action-When Major
Local Action Is Federalized
The threshold question in a NEPA case is whether "major federal
action" is involved. If not, NEPA does not apply. NEPA does not define
the term "major federal action." It did, however, establish the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to "formulate and recommend national
policies to promote the improvement of the quality of the environment. "3
CEQ, in turn, has promulgated regulations defining "major federal ac-
tion. 3' The Supreme Court has held that "CEQ's interpretation of NEPA
is entitled to substantial deference." 32
CEQ regulations prescribe a broad interpretation of NEPA's applica-
bility.33 Actions need not be totally federal in nature. In fact, nonfederal
actions which are "assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal
agencies," ' are subject to NEPA requirements. Also, a federal agency's
failure to act can trigger NEPA when this failure is reviewable under the
Administrative Procedures Act or other law as agency action."
When primarily nonfederal action is involved, courts have attempted
to find the limits of the CEQ's liberally inclusive definition of "major
federal action." One focus has been CEQ's requirement that actions
"potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. . ." be labeled
as "major federal action." 36 Federal control requires that the agency have
the authority to exercise a certain degree of discretion concerning the
proposed action. Federal action which is purely ministerial in nature will
not trigger NEPA. 3"
An example of federal discretion which did not amount to potential
federal control arose in California in the summer of 1983. When several
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1982). See Murchison, Does NEPA Matter?-An Analysis of the Historical
Development and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, IS U. Rich.
L. Rev. 557 (1984); but see Fairfax & Barton, A Decade of NEPA: Milestone or Millstone, Renewable
Resources J. Summer 1984 at 22.
31. "'Major Federal action' includes actions with effects that may be major and which are
potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility.... Actions include the circumstances
where the responsible officials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or
administrative tribunals under the Administrative Procedures Act or other applicable law as
agency action.
(a) Actions include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely
or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies;...
(b) Federal actions tend to fall within one of the following categories:
... (4) Approval of specific projects, such as construction or management activities located
in a defined geographic area. Projects include actions approved by permit or other regulatory
decision as well as federal and federally assisted activities."
40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1988).
32. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
33. 40 C.FR. § 1508.18 (1988).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. N.A.A.C.P. v. Medical CTR, Inc., 584 F.2d 619, 634 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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Japanese beetles were found near Sacramento, the State of California set
up a scientific advisory panel to make recommendations for preventing
a possible infestation of bugs. Three members of the eight person panel
were federal employees. The panel recommended an insecticide spraying
program. Local groups and residents sued the Department of Agriculture
for failing to prepare an EIS as required by NEPA.3' The Ninth Circuit
in Almond Hill School v. United States Department of Agriculture held
that though federal involvement on the panel may be a factor in deter-
mining whether NEPA is triggered, in this case federal involvement was
"4marginal at most," and "[mlarginal federal action will not render other-
wise local action federal. 39
In 1982, the City of Denver asked the Tenth Circuit to study the
relationship between rights-of-way over federal lands and NEPA. 4 Den-
ver had in 1924 acquired a right-of-way through national forest lands in
western Colorado in order to divert water to the city water supply. In
City of Denver v. Bergland, Denver asked the court to assess what au-
thority the USFS or BLM had over its construction plans. The court of
appeals held that where Denver's plans indicated a deviation from its
original right-of-way, BLM had sole authority to approve the deviations. 4 '
Exercise of this authority amounted to major federal action and required
BLM to comply with NEPA.42
The Tenth Circuit had earlier held in Davis v. Morton that a federal
agency's power to approve leases of reserved Indian lands constituted
major federal action.43 Later, in Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma
v. Lynn, the Tenth Circuit appears to have chartered the outer limits of
major federal action." The court of appeals found major federal action
in the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) authority
to review a developer's statement of record filed pursuant to the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.45 The Secretary of HUD is required to
approve such statements of record within thirty days or approval will
occur automatically.' Only a procedural defect will prevent automatic
approval. Despite this limited degree of discretion, the Secretary does
have the power to suspend a statement. The Tenth Circuit held that this
federal power to suspend private action amounts to major federal action.47
38. Almond Hill School v. United States Dep't of Agric., 768 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1985).
39. Id. at 1039.
40. City of Denver v. Bergland, 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1982).
41. Id. at 481 (citing 43 C.F.R. §2802.2 (1988)).
42. Id. at 481.
43. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
44. 520 F2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1988).
46. Id. § 1706(a).
47. 520 F.2d at 243-44.
The Third Circuit court of appeals has characterized the Scenic Rivers holding as "questionable
at best." N.A.A.C.P. v. Medical CTR, Inc., 584 F.2d 619, 634 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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The Third Circuit has held that purely "ministerial" agency actions do
not trigger NEPA. In N.A.A.C.P. v. Medical CTR, Inc.,48 HUD approved
a private Delaware hospital's capital expenditure program. The plan had
been previously approved by the state as required by the Social Security
Act. HUD approval merely verified that the correct procedures had been
followed. Such a ministerial action does not trigger NEPA.49 In its hold-
ing, the court noted that HUD did not give any financial or planning
assistance to the program." In dicta, the court observed that even if an
agency has no discretion to exercise, major federal action can exist if the
agency substantially assisted the local action."
No formal test exists to determine what degree of federal involvement
in local action elevates it to the level of major federal action. "The matter
is simply one of degree."' If the federal government has clear power to
cancel a local action, NEPA applies. If the federal involvement is purely
ministerial, NEPA does not apply. In theory, where a federal agency
possesses some discretion over a local action and provides some assistance
to the local actor, major federal action could exist. Courts must make a
case-by-case analysis of federal involvement, in light of NEPA's policy
of broad applicability, to decide this issue.
Need for an Environmental Assessment
NEPA requires that a federal agency prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS) for all major federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment. 3 An EIS is not always necessary,
however, since not all major federal actions have significant environ-
mental effects. In order to determine if a significant impact exists, CEQ
regulations require an agency to prepare an environmental assessment
(EA).54 This "mini EIS" is used to determine if a full EIS is necessary.
If the EA concludes that the environment will not be significantly affected,
the agency is required to issue a finding of no significant impact (FONSI)."
If the EA concludes otherwise, and EIS is commissioned. These docu-
ments serve to satisfy NEPA's twin aims: to encourage environmentally
informed decisionmaking by the government and to provide this envi-
ronmental information to the public.
The Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas & Electric concluded that NEPA
required federal agencies to take a "hard look" at the environmental
48. 584 F.2d 619.
49. Id. at 634.
50. Id. at 631.
51. Id. at 634.
52. Friends of Earth v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 329 (9th Cir. 1975).
53. 42 U.S.C. §4332(C) (1982).
54. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b), 1508.9 (1988).
55. Id. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13.
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consequences of major federal actions.' Courts review agency decisions
based on the "hard look" standard when deciding whether an agency has
satisfied the mandates of NEPA. 7 CEQ regulations represent the pro-
cedural basis for this "hard look."
Courts have generally held CEQ regulations to be mandatory. Agencies
have been required in cases of major federal action to issue an EA followed
by either an EIS or a FONSI. The regulations, however, also point out
that "NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork--even excellent pa-
perwork-but to foster excellent action." 8 The Tenth Circuit has, on one
occasion, found agency procedures adequate even when the procedures
followed did not strictly comply with CEQ regulations.
In Wyoming v. Hathaway, the Tenth Circuit decided against strict com-
pliance with NEPA. 59 Consumers of poisons used for predator control
sought to enjoin the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from issuing
an order which cancelled the registration of three poisons. The plaintiffs
argued that by failing to prepare an EIS, EPA had violated NEPA. The
court rejected this argument, and held that a specific EIS is not always
required if an agency has already produced a study whose objectives and
content were very similar to the proposed EIS.W EPA had already produced
such a study, in the court's view. The Tenth Circuit sought support for
its holding in Congress' intent in passing NEPA:
Congress was seeking to require the governmental agencies to think
about, and consider, environmental considerations in making deci-
sions. It was not intended to force the agency to merely follow out
a regimen. There are enough of these without imposing another.6'
The Hathaway decision stands as an exception to the mandatory re-
quirements of NEPA. To support a policy of cutting waste and needless
paperwork, the court of appeals allowed a prior study to substitute for a
specific EIS,62 "NEPA's most detailed and elaborate environmental doc-
ument."'63 The court failed to consider the public participation aim of
NEPA in its analysis.
Until Sierra Club v. Hodel arose, the Tenth Circuit had not had an
opportunity to decide what, if anything, might substitute for an EA.
Compared to an EIS, an EA is a much less detailed document. Also,
unlike an EIS, an EA is not specifically mentioned in NEPA itself. Only
56. 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
57. T. Vanderver, Jr., National Environmental Policy Act in Environmental Law Handbook 372-
73 (8th ed. 1985).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1988).
59. 525 E2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975).
60. Id. at 72.
61. Id.
62. This study arguably was not very similar to an EIS. 525 F,2d at 73-74 (Seth, I., dissenting).
63. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1099 (10th Cir. 1988) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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CEQ regulations define the EA.' Finally, though an EA is itself sur-
rounded by public participation regulations, the Hathaway court did not
seem interested in such matters. Therefore, the integrity of the EA re-
quirement was jeopardized.
ANALYSIS
Where Is the Major Federal Action?
The District Court Finds It Everywhere
Judge Aldon J. Anderson held "on the basis of the facts, the federal
regulation, Tenth Circuit precedent and the purposes of NEPA," that
BLM's participation in the Burr Trial upgrade amounted to major federal
action.'
More specifically, the court viewed the Tenth Circuit's decision in City
of Denver v. Bergland as dispositive of the issue.' The court interpreted
Bergland as holding that NEPA applied to BLM's consideration of a
deviation from a right-of-way.67 Since BLM determined that Garfield
County had exceeded its right-of-way in ten locations, BLM ordered a
moratorium on construction until the county eliminated these deviations.
The district court held that the existence of such authority triggered NEPA.6
The court, recognizing that "conflicting views of the subject [major
federal action]" existed,' chose to provide further support for its holding
from Tenth Circuit precedent. Judge Anderson cited Scenic Rivers for the
proposition that an "agenc[y's] ability to suspend private action amount[s]
to major federal action." ' In the present case, BLM had a duty to apply
the "reasonable and necessary" standard of Utah law in order to determine
the scope of the county's right-of-way." BLM also had a duty under
FLPMA to protect the WSAs from unnecessary degradation.7" Under the
reasoning of Scenic Rivers, each duty gave rise to BLM authority to
suspend the county's roadwork. Judge Anderson rooted his holding that
the Burr Trail project was major federal action within the meaning of
NEPA in BLM's exercise of its discretion in furtherance of these two
statutory duties.
64. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1988).
65. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 594, 613 (C.D. Utah 1987), affid in part, rev'd in part,
848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
66. d. at 612.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 613.
69. Id. at 612.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 613.
72. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982).
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The Tenth Circuit Agrees Up to a Point
The Tenth Circuit analyzed BLM's authority somewhat differently.
First, the court reviewed the relevant CEQ regulations, caselaw and trea-
tises in order to fashion a test as to when federal involvement with a
nonfederal activity constituted major federal action."3 The court held that
the correct inquiry is "whether BLM either has exercised control over
the County's major road improvement project or has the authority and
duty to do so."'
The court first applied this test to BLM's duty to monitor the county's
roadwork to ensure that it did not exceed the scope of its right-of-way.
The court found that BLM's activities in furtherance of this duty failed
to give BLM the requisite control to trigger major federal action. 7 Al-
though BLM did have control where the county exceeded its right-of-
way, this control vanished when the county corrected its error.76 Since
the county has always returned to its existing right-of-way, BLM has no
control over the project. Therefore, the court reasoned that this BLM
duty does not trigger NEPA.
Next, the court analyzed BLM's duty toward WSAs under FLPMA.
The act specifically protects WSAs, and requires that ". . . the Secretary
[of Interior] shall by regulation or otherwise take any action required to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of (WSAs) .... ,7 The CEQ
promulgated regulations describing which degrading activities should be
regulated.78 One listed activity is roadwork on existing rights-of-way.79
The court of appeals noted that BLM does not have the authority to stop
the county from upgrading the Burr Trail." The court found, however,
that its authority to require the county to pursue alternative plans during
construction which are less degrading to the WSAs amounted to the
exercise of sufficient control over the road project to trigger NEPA's
requirements."'
73. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1988). Though this case focuses
on the "federal" component of major federal action, the court also addressed the "major" component.
Id. at 1092. The court's inquiry into this issue is similar to a finding of "probable cause." The court
found that this project "involves realignments, widening, considerable blasting, a significant im-
provement in the quality of the road surface, and large increases in future traffic," and concluded
that "Islurely that much work is a major project." Id.
74. Id. at 1090.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982).
78. See Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Land Under Wilderness Review (IMP),
44 Fed.Reg. 72,014-15 (1979).
79. Revised IMP, 48 Fed.Reg. 31,855 (1983).
80. 848 F.2d at 1090.
81. Id.
Winter 19901
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
Judge Barrett, in dissent, urged "that there is simply no principled
difference between the two federal responsibilities .... "82 He found that
neither responsibility triggered NEPA. However, the dissent agreed with
the district court's finding that both federal duties involve an element of
control. He found that the discretion which BLM must exercise in de-
termining the "reasonable and necessary" scope of the county's right-of-
way "is virtually the same" as the discretion involved in protecting WSAs
from "unnecessary and undue degradation. "83 Though the dissent at-
tempts to point to an inconsistency in the majority, it fails to answer the
ultimate question of why BLM's involvement in this case does not rise
to the level of major federal action.
The three different results reached by the federal judges deciding this
case exemplify the lack of adequate guidance in this area. All three judges
reach logical solutions based on current CEQ regulations and caselaw.
The Tenth Circuit majority's approach may be the most acceptable simply
because it charters a middle road.
The CEQ has adopted a guideline as to what federal activities tend to
federalize an otherwise local activity." CEQ should compliment this list
by formulating a second list of activities which do not tend to trigger
NEPA. Though such a list could hardly be exhaustive, it would likely
guide courts to more reasoned and consistent opinions. It may also help
alleviate the tremendous NEPA caseload in the federal court system. 5
The Environmental Assessment Requirement
The District Court Satisfied the Requirement Itself
Judge Anderson began his discussion by pointing out that "classically"
after a finding of major federal action, an agency is required to prepare
an EA, followed by either an EIS or a FONSI. The court conceded that
under ordinary circumstances, a court would violate the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction by retaining jurisdicion to conduct its own factfinding.86
The court found, however, that this was not such a classic case. 7
82. 848 F.2d at I 100 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. 40 C.FR. § 1508.18 (1988).
85. It should be noted that Sierra Club petitioned for rehearing in this case on the major federal
action issue. The Tenth Circuit had only found major federal action in the Secretary of Interior's
duty under FLPMA § 603(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982) to protect WSAs from unnecessary deg-
radation. Sierra Club wished to raise the issue of whether the Secretary's duty under FLPMA § 302(b),
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1982) to protect all public lands from unnecessary and undue degradation
implicated NEPA. The court declined to grant rehearing on the issue, holding that the assertion of
a new grounds for relief was not a correct grounds for rehearing under Fed. R. App. P. 40(a). 848
F2d at 1100-01.
86. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 594, 602 (C.D. Utah 1987), affid in part, rev'd in part,
848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 604.
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The case was unique first, because Sierra Club had requested that the
court act as factfinder. Sierra Club also actively participated in a twenty-
five-day factfinding trial. Second, the court found that BLM had prepared
a "substantial record" in the case."8 The court recognized that the agency
has factfinding expertise and that the court's role is one of review.89
However, Judge Anderson proceeded to treat the evidence presented at
trial as a part of the record which he must review in order to determine
if the agency has taken a "hard look" at the environmental consequences
of its action.9'
The Tenth Circuit Rejects Any Judicial Factfinding under NEPA
The Tenth Circuit did not agree with Judge Anderson that this case
was out of the ordinary. First, the court of appeals addressed the fact that
Sierra Club had requested judicial environmental factfinding. This re-
quest, BLM argues on appeal, amounted to a waiver by Sierra Club to
challenge the district court's factfinding.9'
BLM's Waiver Argument
The court of appeals recognized the principle that a party may not
complain on appeal of errors which that same party had invited below.'
The court, however, rejected BLM's argument that Sierra Club had done
this. First, the court noted that Sierra Club had consistently charged BLM
with procedural NEPA violations in this case.93 As a result, the court
strongly doubted that Sierra Club intended the court's factfinding to re-
place its NEPA challenges." Second, the court held that since NEPA
imposes procedural requirements on public agencies, private parties such
as Sierra Club probably did not have the authority to waive the statute's
requirements ."
The dissent attacked each of these grounds. First, Judge Barrett found
that Sierra Club had in fact requested judicial factfinding fully intending
the district court to decide the matter." Second, the dissent noted that
federal courts "do not enforce NEPA in a vacuum or sua sponte."'97 If
88. Id. at 602.
89. id.
90. See id. at 604.
91. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1092 (10th Cir. 1988).
92. d. (citing Deland v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 1985).
93. ld.
94. Id.
95. ld. at 1092.
96. Id. at 1099 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Judge Barrett raises the question, "Why did the parties
present exhaustive trial testimony and exhibits dealing with environmental issues involving the Burr
Trail project to the district court if the parties did not intend that the district court decide them?"
Id. at 1099 n.4.
97. Id. at 1099 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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Sierra Club, a private party, had not sought an injunction based on NEPA,
no injunction would issue. Therefore, Sierra Club should be able to waive
the NEPA challenges which Sierra Club itself brought. The dissent did
not wish to give Sierra Club a "second chance to dispute settled facts""8
and thereby waste "... the excellent results of a lengthy and compre-
hensive trial. ""
NEPA and Its Regulations Require an
Environmental Assessment
After disposing of the waiver argument, the court held that the district
judge had in fact usurped the BLM's authority by first excusing the
agency's failure to prepare an EA, and then finding that the road project
would have no significant impact."° The court held that "an agency's
failure to prepare an environmental assessment constitutes reversible error
which cannot be cured by district court findings."''
The Tenth Circuit rooted its holding in the unambiguous command of
CEQ regulations."0 2 BLM is required to take a "hard look" at the con-
sequences of its proposed actions. These regulations are mandatory and
contain very few exceptions.'03
The court made it clear that NEPA and its regulations fail to give a
district court any factfinding role. The agency must take the "hard look."
The court's role is simply one of review of the agency's record. If the
agency has not created a sufficient record, the court's only course of
action is to remand the issue to the agency."'4
The Role of the Public in the NEPA Process
The majority also rooted its holding in NEPA's underlying policy of
public participation. The court cited numerous instances where NEPA
and its regulations provide for public involvement in the study process.5
The act provides that the public shall have access to the governmental
statements and comments used by the preparer of an environmental state-
ment. " The CEQ requires that agencies "shall involve ... the public,
to extent practicable, in preparing [environmental] assessments." 7 Also,
FONSIs shall be released to the public,"° and any FONSI involving
98. Id.
99. id. at 1097 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1092-93.
101. Id. at 1093.
102. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1988).
103. Id.
104. 848 F.2d at 1093 (citing Florida Power & Light v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)).
105. Id. at 1093-94.
106. 42 U.S.C. §4332(C) (1982).
107. 40 C.FR. § 1501.4(b) (1988).
108. Id. § 1501.4(e)(1).
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unprecedented actions shall not be finalized until public review has taken
place. " Allowing a court to conduct factfinding at trial would circumvent
this process, and effectively thwart the public's role in NEPA decision-
making. The "cross-pollination of views [resulting from public partici-
pation] could not occur within the enclosed environs of a courtroom."" 0
The Other Circuits
The court of appeals looked for additional support for its holding from
other jurisdictions, but no other district court judge appears to have con-
ducted such extensive NEPA-related environmental factfinding at trial.
The court did find some support in two Ninth Circuit decisions. " ' Both
cases involved Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) decisions
which constituted major federal actions. FERC failed in each case to file
an EA. The agency simply claimed that there would be no significant
environmental impact resulting from its actions. The Ninth Circuit held
that this failure to prepare an EA constituted reversible error. The court
refused to conduct a judicial search of FERC's record to determine if the
agency had taken a "hard look" before reaching its conclusions.
The Ninth Circuit refused to even review an agency's existing record
to determine if the decision not to prepare an EIS was justified. The court
remanded for the preparation of an EA. By implication, it is unlikely
that the Ninth Circuit would allow a district court to create a record at
trial.
The Impact of Sierra Club Y. Hodel
The Tenth Circuit failed to explore the public participation policies and
procedures of NEPA when Wyoming v. Hathaway allowed a prior envi-
ronmental study to substitute for an EIS. In Sierra Club v. Hodel, the
court rediscovered these NEPA underpinnings and used them to protect
an EA from a similar fate.
In Hathaway, the court allowed a prior EPA study to substitute for an
EIS. The court deemed the study to be the functional equivalent of an
EIS. In so ruling, the court elevated CEQ's introductory statement that
NEPA was more concerned with excellent action than with excellent
paperwork"2 above NEPA's own requirement that an EIS be prepared
and the public be informed. The court's drive for efficiency failed to
consider the mandatory nature of NEPA's EIS requirement and the role
which the public is to play in an agency's preparation of an EIS.
109. id. § 1501.4(e)(1), 1506.6.
t10. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1094 (10th Cir. 1988).
11I. LaFlamnme v. F.E.R.C., 842 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1988); The Steamboaters v. F.E.R.C., 759
F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1985).
112. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(C) (1988).
Winter 1990)
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
In Sierra Club, Judges Anderson and Barrett followed Hathaway's lead
by concluding that sound agency action is more important than simply
following NEPA procedure. Judge Barrett's dissent posed the question
why, if prior environmental studies coupled with extensive trial testimony
showed that the Burr Trail project will have no significant environmental
impact, should the court of appeals remand the case to BLM to reach the
same conclusion based on a less extensive study labeled an EA." '3
The majority responded with the arguments which were absent in Hath-
away. First, NEPA has mandatory procedural requirements which a court
should enforce, not circumvent. Second, NEPA's integrity is tied to the
participation of the public in the process. Substitute EISs or EAs close
the door on public involvement.
If the Tenth Circuit is given an opportunity to revisit its decision in
Hathway, the powerful reasoning in Sierra Club v. Hodel could prevail
this time around.
CONCLUSION
Twenty years after NEPA's enactment, the Tenth Circuit has protected
the integrity of the act by vacating a district court's environmental fact-
finding. In so doing, the court of appeals has drawn a line by refusing
to allow evidence introduced at trial to supplement an inadequate envi-
ronmental assessment. The court declined to extend the paperwork-effi-
ciency rationale of Hathaway to allow the judiciary to supplement a
substantial but incomplete agency record. The court resurrected the public
participation policy of NEPA, absent in Hathway, to reach its holding.
The court of appeals thereby protected the environmental assessment, an
essential procedure in an "essentially procedural" statute." 
4
Finally, much litigation still centers on the issue of what constitutes
major federal action. Without further guidance, courts will continue to
exercise great leeway in analyzing this threshold question. The tremen-
dous range of federal actions and federal involvement in local actions
ensures the continued popularity of NEPA lawsuits. Also, the fact-specific
nature of the individual cases and subsequent opinions effectively limits
the scope of their precedent. Only new legislative or CEQ guidance in
this area can lead the courts in a consistent path and help reduce the sheer
quantity of their NEPA case loads.
CHRISTOPHER BULMAN
113. See 848 F.2d at 1097, 1099 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
114. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark,
720 F.2d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983).
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